Annotation of the results obtained in 2021
I. Description of the work carried out in the year under report. Within the framework of the project "Phenomenon of Evil: from Metaphysics to the Theories of Morality" the team of authors has fully implemented the work plan planned for 2021. 9 articles were prepared and accepted for publication (No 4, 2021) in the journal "State, Religion, Church in Russia and Abroad" (Scopus, Q. 1). A collective monograph "The Problem of Evil and Theodicy: Metaphysics, Ethics, Phenomenology" was prepared. A conference "Phenomenon of Evil: Metaphysics, Theodicy, Morality" was held (https://iphras.ru/fenomen_zla.htm). II. Description of the scholarly results obtained in the year under report. "The Problem of Evil: Metaethics and the Privation Theory of Evil". It is commonplace in contemporary philosophy of religion to distinguish between logical and inductive formulations of the problem of evil. However, there is also a metaethical (or ‘axiological’) formulation of the problem. The research is devoted to the consideration of the privation theory of evil, one of the most ancient responses to the argument from evil. In the first part, the metaethical formulation of the problem is considered. In the second, the privation theory of evil is analyzed as it is presented in the writings of Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas. It is shown that the concept of ‘order’ (ordo) is one of the main elements of their treatments of the privatio boni-theory and it is complemented by the common to the Western theological tradition teaching of two types of evil: sin (peccatum) and punishment for sin (poena peccati) in case of Augustine, and evil of punishment (malum poenae) and evil of guilt (malum culpae) in case of Aquinas. In the third part, it is argued turn to the metaethical presuppositions of the privatio boni-theory: in moral ontology it is most compatible with moral realism, in moral epistemology—with cognitivism and epistemological foundationalism, and in moral psychology—with one of the versions of motivational internalism. "The Phenomenon of evil, naturalistic fallacy, and theory of transcendentals". The naturalistic fallacy most obviously expresses the problem of conceptualizing the concepts of good and evil. The research proposes to consider this problem in the context of the history of philosophy. In particular it is shown that, contrary to the ideas of J. Moore, his approach to the definition of “good” is not new, because similar problems we met in Plato and Aristotle. Nevertheless, the “naturalistic fallacy” implies the fact that there is a crisis of basic in contemporary culture. The main goal of this research is, firstly, to consider this crisis and, secondly, to try to outline a way out within the theory of transcendentals. "Would existence of Hell be an evil?" In the traditional sense, the existence of postmortem life in general, heaven and hell in particular, seems to be a prerequisite for divine justice. In a somewhat simplified form, this understanding asserts that people who have led a correct way of life, from a moral point of view, are rewarded with eternal bliss, which, by its very nature, is an infinitely great good, capable of compensating for any temporary suffering that they have endured in this life. On the other hand, people who have committed evil, but have not repented of it or compensated it in this life, will have to do so in the future life regardless of their desire. In contemporary analytic theology and philosophy of religion, such understanding of postmortem retribution is questioned. In particular, the target for criticism is the existence of hell, because many researchers claim that the very existence of hell with its eternal torment seems to be evil, incompatible with the unconditional love of God for all people. This research examines different arguments for the claim that the existence of eternal hell would be evil, incompatible with God's unconditional love for all people. "Idle Freedom and the Problem of Hell". This paper examines the problem of the practical and social significance of the belief in free will on the example of D. Pereboom's theory of hard incompatibilism. First, the general elements of hard incompatibilism are presented focusing on its positive aspects that involve a forward-looking approach to moral responsibility and a proposal to replace a number of allegedly destructive reactive attitudes with less damaging and more constructive ones. Second, the general logic of moral justification underlying Pereboom’s approach is discussed. It is argued that this logic entails the irrelevance of the belief in free will for the moral justification of social practices. Third, the main features of the problem of hell are outlined in order to show that hell could not be morally justified in Pereboom’s logic of moral justification. This means that the idea of hell provides a unique example where the belief in libertarian free will plays a crucial role in the structure of moral justification. On this basis, it is argued that while the belief in free will is mostly irrelevant for the justification of social practices, it might play a crucial role in the justifications of religious practices that involve the belief in hell. "The phenomenon of Evil in the Atheistic Discourse: The Illusion of Heuristic Advantage". The research considers an argument formulated by a number of contemporary philosophers (G. Oppy, P. Draper) that atheism has a kind of heuristic advantage in explaining the phenomenon of evil, which in discussions between theism and naturalism allows us to justify the rational choice of a theoretical (worldview) position in favor of the latter. Then turning to the analysis of the relevant secular literature, stating, on the one hand, the peripheral nature of the problem of evil for non-theistic thinking, and on the other, the trend that the need for articulation and conceptualization of the problem of evil within the framework of secular thinking is analyzed. Naturalistic and skeptical attempts to eliminate the problem of evil from secular worldviews are also considered. At the same time, a conclusion is drawn that there is a process of forming a separate subject area, a kind of secular evil-studies, the assessment of the heuristic potential and productivity of which will become possible only after the further development of this problem field. At the same time, the question is raised about the problematic nature of the assumption often implied in secular concepts and ideas about evil that the description of the mechanics of evil realization is identical with its explanation. It is concluded that the point of view, according to which evil is considered as a problem that is relevant exclusively for theistic thinking, is the result of a kind of inertness of the intellectual history, and the explanation of evil is one of the vulnerable problems of the atheistic (and more broadly, secular) discourse, without a fruitful resolution of which it is not possible to talk about the heuristic advantage of atheism in the context of the problem of evil. "Justification of Morality as a Problem of the Kantian Ethics". The subject of this research is the justification of morality problem. The prerequisites and meaning of this problem, as well as its place in the ethical system of Kant and historical transformation of ethical ideas are investigated. At the first stage, the prerequisites of the problem in question are revealed. At the second stage, the question of the place of this problem in Kant's ethical system and the proposed method of its solving is analyzed. Kant's assertion of religious postulates is thought of as a specific way of justifying morality. At the third stage, the historical fate of the doctrine of postulates is reconstructed – particulary its refraction in the thought of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. The analysis allows a) to establish the significance of religious postulates as a necessary part of Kant's ethical system that protects morality from devaluation, b) to compare the solutions of the justification of morality problem in the Kantian thought and in Lermontov’s poetry, c) to reconstruct the logic of the transition from Kant's ethical system to thought of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. It is shown that religious postulates, on the one hand, ensure the unity and integrity of moral experience, but, on the other hand, do it contrary to the logic of modern thought. The transition from the ethical absolutism of Kant to the radical doubt in morality in the thought of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche is shown as necessary. It is concluded that within the framework of the Enlightenment thought, it is not possible to find the solution of the justification of morality problem. "The Relational Dimension of the Problem of Evil and the Mystical Theodicy". In this research, the author examines the problem of evil from the perspective of the antitheodicy, which is based on a critique of traditional formulations and approaches to the problem of evil. It is demonstrated that the foundations of the antitheodicy and is offered identification of the existential dimension of the problem of evil within the framework of religious life, the specificity of which is expressed in the concept of "theological relational trauma". From this perspective, the existential root of the problem of evil within the religious life consists in the discovery of the inability of the individual to love God. The dependence of theoretical reflection of the problem of evil on the existential level of the problem is shown. Two solutions based on the notion of mystical experiece to the problem of evil are offered. The phenomenological properties of that mystical experience are highlighted. The research demonstrates that this move provides a solution to the existential problem of evil in an antitheodical spirit.

 

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Annotation of the results obtained in 2019
I. Description of the work done in the reporting period. Within the project “Phenomenon of Evil: from Metaphysics to Moral Theories”, our team has completed the project's aims for 2019. Specifically, we studied a substantial amount of relevant scholar literature on the project's topic, 7 scholar articles have been prepared for publication — 2 papers were published in the journal indexed in RSCI, 1 is accepted in the journal indexed in Web of Science, 1 in Scopus, are accepted for publication in journals indexed in the RSCI). We are working on new scholar papers according to the general plan. A conference on the project's topic is to be held in 2020 and under preparation. II. Description of the scientific results obtained in the reporting period. Kirill Karpov focused in his research on an epistemic contradiction between Augustinian theodicy and logical version of the problem of evil. In his research, he shows that (1) denial of the phenomenon of evil in Augustinian theodicy itself and on the contrary, its establishment as a fact of the external world in any version of the problem of evil could be explained by the fact that they represent different doxastic practices, and, moreover, these doxastic practices enables functioning of different worldviews. (2) The logical version of the problem of evil as a doxastic practice belongs to the 'secular humanism' worldview. So (3) doxastic practices, involved in the logical version of the problem of evil, on the one hand, and Augustinian theodicy, on the other, are based on a completely different epistemic awareness of good and evil. This leads to the idea that (4) there is an epistemic gap between good and evil, which marks a fundamental metaphysical difference between good and evil as phenomena. Alexey Gaginsky researched the problem of evil within the framework of metaphysics of essence (or metaphysics of goodness), which is a specific characteristic of Ancient and Medieval philosophy. The concept of evil was conceptualized in this kind of metaphysics as a lack or privation of the good, i.e. destruction of essence. He shows that if we continue reasoning along with these lines, it will lead to 'non-existence'. The concept of evil as a lack of goodness becomes unsatisfactory since the beginning of the 17th century, as the good and evil were considered as relative concepts. These kinds of concepts do not exist by nature, that is why there are substantial grounds to reject them. Such rethinking of the concepts of the good and evil led to the formulation of the problem of theodicy: despite the fact that the phenomenon of evil was discussed in early philosophical texts, only since the 17th century it was considered as an objection to the existence of God. That is why many contemporary philosophers erroneously reduce the problem of evil to the problem of theodicy. Igor Gasparov in his work on the concepts of evil and divine commitment shows that they underlie any atheistic argument from evil, especially those developed by J.L. Mackey and W. Rowe. He argues that despite the fact that from a formal point of view the logical and inductive arguments from evil relate to different types of arguments from evil, they are based on similar ideas about the nature of evil, and about the obligations of God in relation to his creation. This fact also means that atheistic arguments from evil assume, on the one hand, quasi-dualistic representation of nature of evil according to which evil is absolute opposition of the good, on the other hand, subordination of the God to ethics of well-being which implies care of well-being of all rational and capable to suffer beings as unconditional duty. The arguments from evil presuppose the truth of moral realism, which faces significant difficulties in justifying the existence of objective good and evil. Alexander Mishure researched the ratio of reliability of the ability to measure the grounds for action in any field of activity. He shows that this ability depends on the degree of practical access to the grounds for action, where practical access implies the ability to implement the actions that are dictated by these grounds. It has been shown that a radical restriction on practical access to God’s possible grounds can be considered according to the principle of examination as evidence for taking our ability to measure the grounds for actions as unreliable. If this argument is sound, then presupposition that some evil in the world provides us with perfect grounds for God’s intervention is also unreliable. In this case, evil cannot serve as a testimony against the existence of Almighty God. Vladimir Sidorin reconstructed the line of secular ethical thinking within the atheistic movement in Russian thought of 'Populism" ('Narodnichestvo') — first of all P.L. Lavrov and, then, N.I. Kareev. He argues that Russian populism was in Russian philosophical culture a new way of grounding of moral philosophy, free from metaphysical and theistic attitudes. He shows that the attempt of psychological grounding of morality through the appeal to the psychological reliability of moral phenomena was of key feature of this movement. In his analysis of Lavrov's and Kareev's attitude to the problem of evil within these psychological tendencies in their ethical systems, Sidorin characterizes them as arbitrary of the moral categories, full of eclecticism, leanings to contradictory argumentation. Those ethical systems represent all the difficulties through which Russian philosophers of the end of the 20th century were looking for opportunities of the “atheistic” grounding of morality. Alexey Skomorokhov in his work shows that evil cannot be explained by means of moral-theological argument, as the necessary explanation of evil to moral consciousness cannot be provided from the inside of the (dominant) metaphysics of the Modernity, based on the principles of objectivity and autonomy. The combination of the need to explain evil with the awareness of the impossibility of explaining it gives rise to a repressive picture of the “multi-storey humanity” (the utopia of the Great Inquisitor). He shows that the way out of this situation is to look for the refuse from the metaphysics of the Modernity, in which the ideas of God, immortality and freedom are dependent on the principle of practical reason. Bogdan Faul in his analysis of the basic concepts of M.Adams' pragmatic argument argues that there is a missing conceptual element in her argument, which he labelled as an "experience of awareness of evil". That is why he considers the pragmatic argument to be conceptually mistaken. Then he proposes a possible correction of the argument. He also analyzes the main motivations for accepting the argument: it is valid for optimists and realists (those who have experience of awareness of evil), for those who believe that a human being is important and that human life has a deeply subjective and objective meaning.

 

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Annotation of the results obtained in 2020
I. Description of work done in the year under report. Within the framework of the project "The Phenomenon of Evil: From Metaphysics to the Theories of Morality," the team has completed the project's aims for 2020. 12 articles were prepared, of which 4 were published and 7 are in press in domestic scientific journals, one paper is in print in a foreign scholar journal. Of the prepared articles, 6 are about to be indexed in the Web of Science and Scopus, one in Scopus, 5 in the RSCI. The cfp was announced for participation in the conference "The Phenomenon of Evil: Metaphysics, Theodicy, Morality". The program of the conference is scheduled. Information on the date of the conference as well as the list of participants are placed on the website of the Institute of Philosophy (https://iphras.ru/fenomen_zla.htm). II. Description of the scholar results obtained in the reporting period. As a result of the study of the moral criticism of theodicy, it is shown that one of the central problems in both contemporary philosophy of religion and ethics concerns the offensiveness of any theodicy, explanation and justification of suffering in the light of the tragic events in the history of the 20th century. A distinction between theoretical and existential functions of theodicies is made. It is argued that any existential theodicy presupposes a theoretical one, and any moral critique must target the theoretical theodicy. Stronger and weaker versions of a possible moral criterion for theodicy are established and argued that while the stronger version might prohibit any intellectual practice, the weaker one is applicable to both theoretical and existential theodicies and defenсes. As a result of the study of the role of the privatio boni account of evil in the theistic worldview, it is shown that the understanding of 'good' and 'evil' in contemporary debates raises a completely different problem of evil in comparison to its traditional version. Secondly, the analysis of the privative theory of evil allowed to answer the following questions: what concepts of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are used in it, what classifications of the phenomenon of evil are assumed in it, what explanations for the existence of different types of evil are used. It is showed that such thinkers as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas proposed a privative theory of evil as only one of the elements of their theodicies, they had never used it as a separate kind of theodicy, whereas contemporary thinkers tend to see it as a self-sufficient explanatory model. As a result of the study of metatheodicy, it is argued that metatheodicy can be considered as an interdisciplinary project in which a large amount of different scholar data can be ordered into a single whole. It is shown that one methodological advantage of metatheodicy is that a researcher does not take a certain position, but tries to consider different approaches to the problem. Analyzing the logic of how theodicies were born in the history of European thought, it is shown that metatheodicy can potentially better cope with atheistic criticism than traditional approaches since the tasks of metatheodicy include clarifying the intellectual situation when the question of human suffering and the silence of God in general becomes meaningful, that is, a supporter of metatheodicy develops 'outside view', thereby contributing to a more productive analysis of the whole complex of problems involved in the problem of evil. As a result of the study of the 'is-ought problem' (or 'Hume's guillotine'), according to which it is prohibited to make claims about what ought to be that are based solely on statements about what is, it is shown that if 'Hume's guillotine' and its subsequent adaptation in metaethics assumes the ontology of atomic facts, then when the ontological model is revised, the separation of what exists from what is ought will turn out to be itself problematic. It is argued that from this point of view the 'Hume's guillotine' becomes a pseudo-problem since it works only within the framework of a reductionist methodology when moral judgment is decontextualized. A more correct approach to this problem is proposed, according to which what is and what is ought should not be separated. As a result of the study of God's relation to sin in classical theism, it is shown that from the perspective of classical theism the problem of God's relation to sin lies in the difficulty of reconciling the divine attribute of simplicity with the presence of the evil of sin in the world created and controlled by God. Analyzing two classical approaches to the problem (Thomism and Molinism) it is shown that they are not able to offer an adequate solution, because they claim the real difference either within the divine will or within the divine knowledge. As an alternative, an aretic approach to understanding the divine is proposed, which makes use of some ideas of S. Menn and L.T. Zagzebski. The central idea of this approach is that the divine is to conceive not as a mental subject exemplifying some set of properties to a maximal degree, but as a single and absolutely simple source of these properties. This approach provides an opportunity to demonstrate how God can be love itself, righteousness itself, wisdom itself, omnipotence itself, but at the same time not to be identified with an abstract entity. It allows also to conceive of the divine providence in terms of an interaction between God and the world, but hierarchically. Finally, the aretic approach rejects the unqualified identification of God with a person which allows avoiding the problem of evil in the form which is typical for the contemporary philosophical theology and philosophy of religion. As a result of the study contemporary free will defences (proposed by Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne), it is shown that contemporary forms of free will defences share with atheistic arguments from evil an anthropomorphic model of God, in which God is thought as an individual among other individuals, although endowed with attributes such as omniscience and omnipotence to an excellent degree. It has also been shown that another important point of similarity between contemporary free will defences and atheistic arguments from evil is that both attempt to assess what our world would be like if created by such an individual. In contrast to atheistic arguments from evil, contemporary free will defences argue that divine omnipotence and omniscience are subject to some greater restrictions, as usually assumed, especially due to God’s desire to give some of his creations the ability of free choice, which logically implies the possibility and even necessity of the existence of evil. It is demonstrated that classical theism does not share the anthropomorphic model of deity typical for many contemporary philosophers of religion. The classical theism rejects both the anthropomorphic model of deity and the unaccountability of free will to God as the supreme good. As a result of the analysis of the metaethical assumptions of arguments from evil, it is shown that arguments from evil are incompatible with metaethical antirealism because their premises might be true in the relevant sense only on realistic assumptions. Metaethical naturalism makes arguments from evil circular and metaethical supernaturalism renders them incoherent. It is argued that the only form of realism that seems compatible with the arguments from evil is non-naturalism. It is shown also that although coherentism might be used to construe the arguments from evil, it makes these arguments dialectically weak because it seems more rational for a theist to deny the reality of gratuitous and horrendous evil than to deny the reality of God. It is shown further that moral intuitionism might explain why the denial of these kinds of evil might be difficult for theists. Finally, it is argued that the arguments from evil presuppose external relation between moral judgements and motives of God and indefeasible necessary relation between reasons and motives. As a result of the study of the historical and conceptual interrelations between libertarianism and classical theism, it is shown that the concept of classical theism was introduced in the contemporary philosophy of religion by the proponent of process theology Ch. H. Hartshorne to criticize European philosophical and theological tradition. Hartshorne himself thought that classical theism contradicts the libertarian understanding of free will. Two hypotheses were proposed in order to explain the existing association between libertarianism and classical theism in the contemporary philosophy of religion. It is argued that although libertarianism is more suited to address the problem of evil and the doctrine of eternal damnation than theological compatibilism, it nevertheless faces serious problems on the way of reconciliation with classical theism. To explain evil and eternal damnation libertarian free will have to be understood as having a great value. However, the value of libertarian freedom might be challenged by exploring its contradictions with such divine perfections as divine goodness and divine foreknowledge and the doctrine of divine conservation. In order to solve theological puzzles, one needs to develop an explicitly theological libertarian understanding of free will that depends on theological values and does not pretend to be compatible with naturalism and atheism. As a result of the analysis of the ethical views of Russian Marxists in the first quarter of the XX century, it is admitted that at the beginning of the 20th century Russian Marxism which was rapidly gaining intellectual and political influence was faced with the need to develop its ethical concept, since the 'atheistic ethics', represented by the philosophy of Russian narodniki and European social democrats, were found ideologically unacceptable. It is shown that the critical role in the heterogeneous circles of Russian Marxism in the first two decades of the 20th century was played by the concepts introduced by A. Bogdanov, L. Aksel’rod, and A. Lunacharskii. If Bogdanov proclaimed historical legality and morality as such as forms of ideological consciousness abolished in the course of social evolution, then Aksel’rod sought to defend and justify a universalist understanding of morality, faced with the need to reconcile this understanding with the key provisions of historical materialism. In turn, A. Lunacharskii found himself in an equally difficult situation, trying to reconcile the position on the self-sufficiency of the Marxist worldview with the obvious, as it seems to him, feeling of the need for its “ethical supplement” and finding a solution in the peculiar identification of the ethical and aesthetical. These attempts reflect the contradictory content of this aspect of classical Marxism: the explication of the ethical element of the legacy of Marx and Engels led them to the dramatic divergence in conclusions. The reason for the discrepancies in Marxist ethics is not only the versatile influences of Hegel and Feuerbach but also the proclaimed dialectical unity of freedom and necessity for interpreting this unity with all the rich potential, as well as the problematic correlation of the class and common historical approaches. As a result of the analysis of the attempts of to synthesize the Marxist approach and Neo-Kantianism, represented in the works of K. Vorländer, C. Schmidt, L. Voltmann and E. Bernstein, it is shown that these attempts were undertaken in the context of discussions about the necessity and possibility of elaborating a moral theory that complements socialist social and political philosophy and, at the same time, opposes the former “metaphysics of morals” and theistic justifications of morality. It is shown also that the Neo-Kantian movement in socialism, usually associated with the desire to justify the socialist ideal using concepts and principles of Kant’s ethics, was in fact much broader and included attempts to use Kant's the theory of knowledge, the philosophical-historical and social-philosophical views and the general critical pathos of his creative heritage. As a result of the analysis of the connection between conceptual problems of the theory of morality and the process of ontologizing of evil in modern culture, it is shown that the problem of justifying morality cannot be resolved within the framework of the logic of thought, certain principles of autonomy and objectivity. The impossibility of justifying morality gives rise to the necessary process of ontologizing evil. The two parallel ethical strategies in the situation of ontologizing evil—the ethics of pity for a weak person and the ethics of "will-to-power"— are revealed which determining the transformation of images of good and evil in contemporary art (and culture in general). As a result of the study of two theodicies proposed by S. Lebens and T. Goldschmidt ("Absolute-Forgiveness" and "No-More-Evil"), it was shown that both theodicies imply the idea that God can completely change the past without leaving any traces. It was argued that Lebens’ and Goldschmidt’s preferred model, which they call the scene-changing theory, is problematic. First, its complex metaphysical foundation could be replaced with presentism (roughly, the view in the ontology of time that only present things exist) without losing any substantial heuristics. Second, their theory either implies a controversial theory of truthmaking under presentistic and hyper-presentistic ontology or implies controversial views on the counting of events under presentistic and hyper-presentistic ontology. It was shown that any theory of elimination/substitution of evils of the past implies that there are unnecessary evils, which is inconsistent with God’s goodness.

 

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